Ghanaian soccer doctrine and the German implodement of Argentina
Rommel, Ghana and implodement of Argentina soccer team
As the international soccer community starts the post-game analysis of Argentina historic collapse in the game with Germany, the Ghana long-ball implodement strategy used by Germany has been replace with cries of ineptness on the part of Argentina substitution and the extraordinary resilience and strength of character of the German players.
Students of German military history know very well that General Erwin Rommel and other German generals were masters of using deep counter attacks in order to in circle and implode other armies. The Ghanaian long-ball strategy is an application of this German military strategy to modern soccer play. At it core, the strategy allows an inferior force to overwhelm a larger force by employing deep attach in the rear to mentally break the larger force will. Ghana was able to create enough scoring opportunities to almost beat Brazil.
The easy defeat of France during the opening of World War II is a case study of implodement.The implodement of the New York Knick, by the Chicago Bull is another example of a better skilled team being beaten by a lesser skilled team.
Argentina fell to the same stretgy playing Germany.
For the first 63 minutes of the game, Argentina was winning the war, by technical superior passing and near total control on the midfield. The South Americans passing allow them to control the tempo, by slowly working the ball between the German defenders. Germany frontal attacks through the midfield all failed for lack of good passing and good South American defensive play. Argentina was able to control more 60 per cent of the possession before the break. German fragile defense was at first having major problem dealing with the technical ability of the smaller Argentina team.
At grteat risk of additional goals being scored by the South Americans, the German coach staff was attacking Argentina outside defenders with deep penetrating Ghanaian long-ball bombardments, forcing then to cover a lot of the field. This was design to physical wear down the South Americans players and create mismatches deep in the Argentina. The German long-ball bombardments also, force the Argentina into a high energy comsuming up-tempo transitional game they could not sustain. The South Americans made the necessary adjustment to the Ghanaian long-ball at great cost of physical of energy later in the game.
The German substitution of (Odonkor 62) was designed to increase the used of the Ghanaian long-ball and to add pressure to the weakening South American transition game. With the midfield wearing down, Argentina substitution of (Frnco71), (Cambiasso 72), and (Cruz 78) were reaction to the increasing German long-ball attack, rather than for counterattack play. The German selection of (Neuville 85) was to further increase the Ghanaian style pressures on the South America defend.
Ghana demonstrated playing Czechs, the United States and even Brazil, the critical long-term value in the endgame of use of the long-ball to force mental implodement of the other team, rather than just wearing the team down. By Germany pressing the attack, the last 45-minute of the game and over time, the Argentina was never able to regain control of the tempo.
In the end the South Americans mentally and phyically collapsed (or implode).
The Argentina mental collapse had nothing to do with German strength of character, and all to do with the German use of Ghanaian doctrine and speed late in the game. Without the employment of the Ghanaian long-ball strategy, the German team would not have gotten in a position to even be a part of the shootout much less win it.
The credit should go to the German coaching, they clearly understood the necessity of not only counter attack as a means of wearing down the much higher skilled South Americans to leverage their larger size, they also knew the critical importance of saving Odonkor and Neuville speed until late in the game to physical overwhelm Argentina by taking control of the tempo, there by gaining more possession time ans shot selection.
The implodement of the Argentina during the shoot-out was the consequence of the German application of the Ghanaian long-ball doctrine over 120 minutes of play. This same doctrine was used many times in NBA by the Chicago Bulls.
German role players like Odonkor are case studies of the emerging type of part to make the Ghanaian system function. This should not be losted on the American national soccer program.
As the international soccer community starts the post-game analysis of Argentina historic collapse in the game with Germany, the Ghana long-ball implodement strategy used by Germany has been replace with cries of ineptness on the part of Argentina substitution and the extraordinary resilience and strength of character of the German players.
Students of German military history know very well that General Erwin Rommel and other German generals were masters of using deep counter attacks in order to in circle and implode other armies. The Ghanaian long-ball strategy is an application of this German military strategy to modern soccer play. At it core, the strategy allows an inferior force to overwhelm a larger force by employing deep attach in the rear to mentally break the larger force will. Ghana was able to create enough scoring opportunities to almost beat Brazil.
The easy defeat of France during the opening of World War II is a case study of implodement.The implodement of the New York Knick, by the Chicago Bull is another example of a better skilled team being beaten by a lesser skilled team.
Argentina fell to the same stretgy playing Germany.
For the first 63 minutes of the game, Argentina was winning the war, by technical superior passing and near total control on the midfield. The South Americans passing allow them to control the tempo, by slowly working the ball between the German defenders. Germany frontal attacks through the midfield all failed for lack of good passing and good South American defensive play. Argentina was able to control more 60 per cent of the possession before the break. German fragile defense was at first having major problem dealing with the technical ability of the smaller Argentina team.
At grteat risk of additional goals being scored by the South Americans, the German coach staff was attacking Argentina outside defenders with deep penetrating Ghanaian long-ball bombardments, forcing then to cover a lot of the field. This was design to physical wear down the South Americans players and create mismatches deep in the Argentina. The German long-ball bombardments also, force the Argentina into a high energy comsuming up-tempo transitional game they could not sustain. The South Americans made the necessary adjustment to the Ghanaian long-ball at great cost of physical of energy later in the game.
The German substitution of (Odonkor 62) was designed to increase the used of the Ghanaian long-ball and to add pressure to the weakening South American transition game. With the midfield wearing down, Argentina substitution of (Frnco71), (Cambiasso 72), and (Cruz 78) were reaction to the increasing German long-ball attack, rather than for counterattack play. The German selection of (Neuville 85) was to further increase the Ghanaian style pressures on the South America defend.
Ghana demonstrated playing Czechs, the United States and even Brazil, the critical long-term value in the endgame of use of the long-ball to force mental implodement of the other team, rather than just wearing the team down. By Germany pressing the attack, the last 45-minute of the game and over time, the Argentina was never able to regain control of the tempo.
In the end the South Americans mentally and phyically collapsed (or implode).
The Argentina mental collapse had nothing to do with German strength of character, and all to do with the German use of Ghanaian doctrine and speed late in the game. Without the employment of the Ghanaian long-ball strategy, the German team would not have gotten in a position to even be a part of the shootout much less win it.
The credit should go to the German coaching, they clearly understood the necessity of not only counter attack as a means of wearing down the much higher skilled South Americans to leverage their larger size, they also knew the critical importance of saving Odonkor and Neuville speed until late in the game to physical overwhelm Argentina by taking control of the tempo, there by gaining more possession time ans shot selection.
The implodement of the Argentina during the shoot-out was the consequence of the German application of the Ghanaian long-ball doctrine over 120 minutes of play. This same doctrine was used many times in NBA by the Chicago Bulls.
German role players like Odonkor are case studies of the emerging type of part to make the Ghanaian system function. This should not be losted on the American national soccer program.
posted by Nubianobserver at 8:58 AM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home