Wednesday, August 16, 2006

The Danger of New York Times New Analysis:Lebanon

The New York Times in a front page new analysis of Lebanon, in its time honor policy of only reporting “all the news that fit to print”, informed it readership that over 50 percent or 500 of the official 954 Lebanon causalities were Hezbollah fighters, not civilians victims.

In the New York Times Analysis-“First The Truce, Then the Test, by Syeven Enlanger, the New York Times states…Hezbollah has been secretive about its loses, and though it denies Israeli claims that 500 of its fighters were killed and 80 percent of its medium-range and longer-range rockets were destroyed, it has almost certainly been hurt more badly than it is willing to admit.”

Then the New York Times makes the dangerous and provocative statement—“So it (Hezbollah) is unlikely to want to test Israel again for some time.”

Hezbollah may have no chioce but to test Israel in order to free their fighters in southren Lebanon.

Many Americans will be shock to learn that while the world is welcoming the end to the war in Lebanon, many Hezbollah resistance fighters remain trapped in positions in southern Lebanon unable to leave.

Over 3,000 Hezbollah forces are being compressed into smaller and smaller areas by Israeli forces, as they are forced to wait for Lebanon and French forces to take over Israeli positions south of the Litani River so the Hezbollah forces can disappear. These Hezbollah fighters are being targeted by deadly Israeli carpet-bombing GPS missiles United States made, M26 Multiple Launch Rockets. Each M26 rocket can take out a square kilometer. In the final days of the war, over 40 Lebanon’s were lost in one day of Israeli M26 carpet-bombing. The head of Hezbollah's special forces may have been a victim of a targeted Israeli carp-bombing.

The French commander of UNIFIL, Maj. Gen Alain Pellegrini, told Associated Press that additional troops were needed quietly because the stability of the cease-fire was fraigile. The region is “not safe from a provocation, or a stray act, that could undermine everything.” On Tuesday, Israeli force killed four more Hezhollah fighters, ten have died in the past two day. (see 3,000 Hezhollah fighters trapped may face Israeli M26 carpet bombing: Nunianobserver )

30,000 Israeli ground forces and 3,000 Hezbollah forces are looking each other in the eye, as ten of thousands of people rush to southern Lebanon. The dynamics of this very dangerous situation was missied in the New York Times new analysis.

The New York Times news analysis is at best tendentious, misleadingly partial analysis and maybe outright politically dangerous, particularly for the people of Lebanon, Israel and new segments of concerned Americans. The self-delusion conclusions of the New York Times news analysis fly in the faced of the emerging military reality on the ground in southern Lebanon and the public domain information about that reality.

The New York Times analysis appears to be is even way beyond the Israeli military and Bush Administration disinformation spinning of the current military capabilities of Hezbollah.

According to the New Yorker magazine article 8/14/2006-“Watching Lebanon” by Seymour M. Hersh”—“Israel intelligence estimated …Hezbollah had roughly five hundred medium-range Fajri-3 and Fajri-5 and a few dozen long-range Zelzal rockets: the Zelzal, with a range of about two hundred kilometers, that could reach Tel Aviv. (One rocket hit Haifa the day after the kidnapping on July 12, 2006). Hezbollah elected not to launch a massive missile Fajr or Zelzal attack on Tel Aviv or other southern Israeli cities during the war for political reason, not military reasons.

The New York Times knows that Hezbollah had the military means and still has the means to hit cities anywhere in Israel.

Using the New Yorker numbers and the 80 percent reduction of the Hezbollah missile portfolio, claimed of unknown Israeli sources reported in the New York Times, would still leave Hezhollah with over 100 medium range Fajr series missiles and a dozen long-range Zelzal missiles. Hezbollah has unknown amounts of anti ship and anti-tank missiles. Also, Hezbollah has over 10,000 small rackets targeting the 30,000 Israeli ground forces in northern Israel and southern Lebanon.

Even more potentially ominous for Israel national security and major cities is the possible transfer of advanced GPS controlled Chinese cruise missiles to Hezbollah missile portfolio.

Critically missing from the New York Times new analysis is the fact that the Israel antimissile shield failed to stop the few long-rang Hezbollah missiles fired. Israel was forced to rush order antimissile units from the US and Europe during the war to address the holes in its shield. The almost 100 missile launchers destroyed during the war, were mostly destroyed by US Space Command and Mossad intell, only after they fired their missiles, not before.

A massive Hezbollah missile attack would have overwhelm the Israeli antimissile and most cities would subject to attack by incoming warheads, whatever their content. This critical fact suppressed by the New York Times from it readership, is not lost to Chinese, Syria, Iran or Hezbollah military planners, and will be addressed in the resupply with next generation multi warhead GPS missiles.

Israeli front cities are in immedicate need of the same kind of antimissile shield being contructed by the United tates and Japan in the Sea of Japan to protect Japanese cities.Given that Hexbollah potentially has 100 Fajr long-range missiles, Israel would a anitmissile shield around its major cities able to fire 400 PAC-3 antimissiles. Israel has less than 25 percent of the needs protection and is force to stand in line behind defenseless US cities like New York, Philly and Boston waiting for their PAC-3 shield deployments.

Also missing from the New York Times new analysis is the fact that Hezbollah was allowed by poor US Space Command battle field management to stand up to one of Israel’s best invasion plans for Lebanon without any anti-air missiles to resist air attacks by Israeli Air Forces. The once invicible Israrli was showned by Hezbollah not to be effective in multi tasking under US Space Command. After losing the missile lanuchers shell to Hezbollah ground forces, the Israeli Air Force was reduced by terror bombing cities. Over 4,000 targets were hit more the once.

At this point, Hezbollah fighters have no fear of Israel and may over rate themselves. This is a major political and military problem for the region.

Hezbollah's reluctance to get its fighters and infrastructure out of southren Lebanon reflects their nerousness about giving up their phyical infrastructure advanage and being totally exposed to Israeli potential carpet bombing. The Washington Pos suggest it(Hezbollah reluctance)"demonstrates the militant Shi'a Musim Movement's increased assertiveness...after a war which it stood off the Israeli army while Lebanon's national arm stood aside."

According to the security expert Gerald Steinberg of Bar-Ilan University—“ Global security article—“The US and Israel: A marriage under pressure”—“Of all Israel’s wars since 1948, this was the one for which Israel was most prepared. Mr. Steinberg elaborated by saying –“ In a sense, the preparation begin in May 2000, immediately after the Israel withdrawal (from southern Lebanon)… By 2004, the military campaign scheduled to last about three weeks…it’s (the war) been simulated scheduled and rehearsed across the board”…

The San Francisco Chronicle reports that diplomats, military officers and some think tanks were briefed a year ago or on the plan outline of the plans that would comprise an intensive three-week operation. According to the New Yorkers, the Israeli plan was based an application of the US Kosovo plan.

The Kosovo model also was design as a case study of the new US Space Command plan for localized fast moving conflicts, the US could leverage high tech spaced based asset against third world armies or limited resistance forces like Hezbollah. The Israel application of the Kosovo plan allow the whole operation to be run by the Vice President by a small self –contained team interfaced with US Space Command as a private war without the check and balances of either the NSC or Congress, lasting a few weeks.

Rather than make the standard Israeli ground thrust into the enemy space, surround and then implode the resistance, in the case of Lebanon first taking the Litani River and sealing the southern region, then destroying the missile infrastructure in a few day, the Israeli general use an aplication of the US Sapce Command's Kosovo model.

The Kosovo plan would allow US Space Command and Israeli Air Forces to over invest time, air power and other resources into locating and destroying the long-range missile infrastructure first, from the air while the northern cities would suffer under daily Hezbollan missile attacks.

The so-called Lebanon infrastructure downgrading terror bombing, was in point of fact, US Space Command trying to find and destroy anything that looked like long-range Hezbollah missile infrastructure. US pace Command did not want the Air Force tied down doing any close air support for the army for the first three weeks.

Hezhollah, Syria, Iran and China understood and planned for years around the notion that the Kosovo plan allowed Hezbollah a small window of opportunity of one to three weeks to rain their small missiles through the Israeli antimissile shield down on northern Israel, while US Space Command and Israeli Air Force were locating and destroying what ever appeared from space as Hezbollah missile infrastructure. The window of opportunity gave Hezbollah a huge advantage both psychologically and strategically to appear to stand up to Israel army and air force. The Hezbollah forces were configured for localized hit and run battles with Israel tanks units and ground forces .

For three long weeks Israeli army general staff was ordered by US Space Command to play this useless game, trying to provoke Hezbollah leadership into firing their long range missiles to give Israel the pretext to attack Iran.

Critical time and Israeli public support was lost by the Israeli general staff in trying to meet the request of the oil lobby and Bush administration to destroy the long-range missile first, from the air. This Israeli oil lobby focus, rather than Israeli national security focus of protecting the northern cites, allowed Hezbollah the freedom to rain over 4,000 missiles down on Israeli cities and finally force a Chinese brokered peace on to Israel. More importantly, Israel were force to deploy ground troopers into southern Lebanon on Hezhollah timetable three week after the time of their most critical military importance.

The US Space Command plan failed because Mossad role was reduce to finding long-range missile infrastructure and not critical information to impact the war. The oil lobby plan also failed because Hezbollah understood the power of the threat of force and not using their long-range missile on southern Israeli cities on world opinion.

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